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1 Introduction
A wide literature suggests that people evaluate outcomes with respect to a reference point. In
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) highly inuential prospect theory, individuals value gains and
losses and are loss averse around a reference point. Yet the determination of the reference point
was left imprecise. It has often been taken to be the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988),
meaning that individuals are reluctant to give up things they currently possess. However, K} oszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) (henceforth KR) argue that reference points are determined by recent
expectations about outcomes, which need not correspond to the status quo. Since individuals often
expect to keep the status quo, much evidence is consistent with either method of determining
reference points. This study provides new experimental evidence that reference points are shaped
by expectations.
In our experiment, we manipulate expectations separately from endowments and the status
quo. We endow subjects with an item (a mug), and randomize the probability that they will be
allowed to exchange that item for an alternative (a pen). We show that when subjects are more
likely to expect to keep their endowed item (because they have a low probability of being allowed to
exchange), they are more likely to choose to keep their item if given the opportunity to exchange.
This result is predicted when expectations determine reference points, but not by theories that
identify the reference point with the status quo or by theories in which preferences do not depend
on reference points.
Evidence on whether reference points matter and on how they are determined is necessary to
choose between competing models of reference-dependent preferences and to predict when such
preferences are likely to manifest themselves (e.g., when we should expect to see loss aversion).1
Moreover, our experiment and the theory of expectation-based reference points can reconcile dif-
ferent ndings regarding the presence or absence of \endowment eects" in exchange experiments
(Knetsch, 1989; Plott and Zeiler, 2007; Knetsch and Wong, 2009). Experimental procedures can
inuence subjects' perceptions of the likelihood that they will be able to exchange their endowed
item for an alternative or that they might also be given the alternative. As our results show, such
expectations can dramatically impact subjects' propensity to exchange. Thus, experimenters test-
ing reference-dependent preference theories should either directly induce these expectations or at
least try to elicit them from the subjects, for instance through debrieng questions.2
There is little other literature directly examining the eect of expectations on reference points.
Smith (2008) experimentally tests a prediction of the KR (2006) theory, namely that a higher
(lagged) probability of receiving an item increases one's valuation for that item. He cannot reject
1Recent theoretical and empirical applications of reference-dependent preferences with expectation-based reference
points include Mas (2006), Heidhues and K} oszegi (2008), Crawford and Meng (2009), and Herweg, M uller, and
Weinschenk (2009).
2When inducing expectations directly, experimenters have to be very careful to avoid potentially mistaken infer-
ences by subjects. In our experiment, we transparently randomize subjects into low or high probability of getting the
option to exchange, so it is clear that there is no information content in this probability. We also report the results
of a pilot in which we did not transparently randomize, and subjects appeared to make value inferences from the
probability with which they were allowed to exchange.
2the null hypothesis that lagged expectations do not matter for valuation.3 Knetsch and Wong (2009)
conduct exchange experiments using a variety of procedures, and discuss their results in terms of
the KR theory. However, they do not manipulate expectations explicitly as we do, and do not
directly test the theory of expectation-based reference points.4 Abeler, Falk, G otte, and Human
(2009) conduct a real-eort experiment in which subjects are equally likely to be paid a piece rate
or to receive a xed payment, and only learn which case applies after they stop working. When
the amount of the xed payment is raised, subjects work more, consistent with KR and related
theories. Their study therefore provides evidence for an eect of expectation-based reference points
on labor supply, and is thus complementary to our experiment which instead focuses on a simple
exchange situation.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we compare how expectations aect the choices of three types of individuals: an
individual with classical preferences (no loss aversion), one with loss aversion around a reference
point given by the status quo, and one with loss aversion around a reference point determined by
expectations (as in KR 2006).5 Consider an individual who is endowed with a mug and expects to
have the option to exchange this mug for a pen with probability p: After being given some time
to think about the situation, she is then asked to register a decision: if the option to exchange
materializes, would she like to exchange?
Let individuals have utility functions u(cjr) that can depend both on consumption c and ref-
erence r. Consumption and reference levels have multiple dimensions (a \mug" dimension and a
\pen" dimension in this application), as in the KR extension of prospect theory. Utility on the kth
dimension is composed of direct consumption utility uk and gain-loss utility with respect to that
dimension's reference level of utility ur

















where  has the properties of the Kahneman-Tversky value function. For simplicity, we follow
Section IV of KR (2006) and assume  to be a piecewise linear function with a kink at zero that
captures loss aversion: (x) = x for x > 0 and (x) = x for x  0, where   0 is the weight
on gain-loss utility and  > 1 is the individual's loss-aversion coecient. This specication nests
classical preferences that do not feature gain-loss utility ( = 0). Throughout, when referring to
individuals with reference-dependent preferences, we assume  > 0.
3However, his standard errors are large enough that he would not have had the power to detect reasonably sized
eects (e.g. a $1, or 15-25%, change in value). Another potential reason why he nds no eect may be that valuations
are elicited after subjects learn whether or not they receive the item, so that the reference point may already have
adjusted to having the item (or not having it) for sure.
4Section 5 will discuss their experiments in more detail.
5A more detailed exposition is provided in the Theory Appendix.
3Now we consider two dierent specications of the reference point. If the reference point is
given by the status quo or by endowments, then we simply have ur
pen = 0 and ur
mug = umug; since
the individual owns the mug.
In contrast, in KR's specication, the reference point is determined by the individual's proba-
bilistic beliefs about outcomes, or in other words, her expectations. KR assume that individuals
calculate an outcome's gain-loss utility as follows: they compare each dimension's consumption
utility from the actual outcome to that of each possible outcome, producing a series of gain-loss
() terms. Each possible outcome's () is then weighted by the probability with which the indi-
vidual expected that outcome to occur.6 Furthermore, an individual's reference point is endogenous
to her plans, as the probabilities of dierent states of the world occurring may depend at least in
part on her decisions.
In our example, if the KR individual plans not to exchange, then her reference point is the
same as in the status quo case | she keeps the mug for sure. If instead she decides to exchange
conditional on having the possibility to do so, the two states of the world she considers for her gain-
loss utility are rend w=pen = f1 pen, 0 mugsg and rend w=mug = f0 pens, 1 mugg; which occur with









. If the exchange occurs, then she gains or loses
nothing with respect to rend w=pen; but with respect to rend w=mug; she gains upen and loses umug:
Thus, her total utility of this outcome would be her consumption utility upen plus her gain-loss
utility (1   p) (upen   umug). Similarly, if the exchange does not occur, her total utility would
be umug +p (umug   upen). Following KR, we assume that the individual acts so as to maximize
her expected utility given her reference point (which itself is determined by her plan), and chooses
the plan that leads to the highest expected utility, given her rationally-forecasted future actions.7
Now, let individuals vary in their value for the mug and for the pen; assume that (umug; upen) are
distributed according to some population distribution function. The following proposition shows
that increasing the probability p with which an individual is allowed to exchange increases the
expected proportion of individuals who choose to exchange when reference points are determined
by expectations, but not when reference points are given by the status quo or when individuals do
not have gain-loss utility.
Proposition 1 If reference points are given by the status quo, or if there is no gain-loss utility
( = 0), then the probability p of having the option to exchange does not aect the decision to
exchange. If reference points are determined by expectations, then increasing p increases the expected
proportion of individuals who choose to exchange.
Proof. When reference points are given by the status quo, the utility of exchanging is greater
6In the application considered in this paper, no predictions would change if reference points were instead simply
given by the expected consumption utility on each dimension.
7In the language of KR, we assume throughout the main part of the paper that the individual plays the \preferred
personal equilibrium." However, the theoretical prediction on the eect of p when using the less restrictive \personal
equilibrium" concept is the same. See the Theory Appendix for more details.
4than the utility of keeping the mug if and only if [upen +  (upen   umug)] > umug, which does not
depend on p: When  = 0; the individual desires to exchange if and only if upen > umug:
However, when reference points are determined by expectations, an individual desires to ex-
change if and only if the expected utility of planning to exchange (and following through on the
plan) is greater than the expected utility of planning to keep the mug (and keeping it). This is true
when (upen   umug) +  (1   p)(1   )(upen + umug) > 0: Note that upen > umug is a necessary
condition for the individual to desire to exchange, as for p < 1 the second term is negative due
to loss aversion. The second term gets less negative as p increases. Therefore, an individual who
chooses to keep the mug under one value of p will always do so for lower values of p; but may
instead choose to exchange for higher values of p:
Intuitively, for an individual who has classical preferences, the decision of whether to exchange
is inuenced only by the consumption utilities she derives from the two items. On the other hand,
an individual who is loss-averse around the status quo may not be willing to give up the mug he
owns for the pen, even if the pen has higher consumption utility, due to the loss he feels from
moving away from the status quo. However, this loss, and therefore the decision, is independent of
whether the chance of the exchange occurring is high or low.
Meanwhile, for an individual with KR-style preferences, the cost imposed by the gain-loss utility
in case she decides to exchange must be outweighed by the gain in consumption utility from getting
the pen instead of the mug, and this is less likely to happen the lower is p. On the other hand,
as p ! 1, gain-loss utility becomes relatively less important. If such an individual were certain to
be able to exchange, she would prefer to do so if and only if the consumption utility from the pen
exceeds the one from the mug, exactly like a classical individual.
One underlying psychological mechanism that may be driving the eect of p is that a higher
probability of ending up with an item increases the time or intensity with which an individual
thinks about the item, and leads her to become attached to the item.8 Though the probability of
ending up with an item is to some extent endogenous to her plans, by lowering the probability of
being able to exchange, we \force" the individual to think about the item she is endowed with. This
in turn increases the chance that the reluctance to lose this \endowment" created by expectations
outweighs the potential consumption utility surplus the alternative item may provide.
3 Experimental Design
In this section, we describe the design of our experiment and the treatment conditions we use to test
our hypothesis, based on Proposition 1, that increasing the probability that subjects have the option
to exchange increases the proportion that choose to exchange, as predicted when reference points are
determined by expectations. Our experiment is a variation of the classic Knetsch (1989) experiment,
8This is related, for instance, to the \emotional attachment mechanism" discussed by Ariely, Huber, and Werten-
broch (2005).
5with many procedural details following Plott and Zeiler's (2007) \loss emphasis treatment."9 We
endow subjects with an item (a Harvard university travel mug) and randomly and transparently
manipulate the individual probability with which a subject will have the opportunity to exchange
her item for an alternative (a silver metal Harvard university pen).10
Upon arrival at the lab, each subject is seated at a carrel with a mug and a pen on it. We
then ip a coin in front of each subject individually. The coin's sides are labeled \1" and \9", and
we give each subject an index card with their resulting number on it. Subjects then start reading
instructions on the computer screen in front of them. Subjects are told that they own the mug
in front of them, and that each participant will leave the experiment with either a mug or a pen.
They are then informed that at the end of the session, they may have the option to exchange their
mug for the pen, if they so desire, and that this option will occur if and only if a ten-sided die that
we roll individually for each subject at the end of the study comes up lower than or equal to the
number on their index card. Thus, subjects whose coin came up \1" have a 10% chance of having
the option to exchange (we will refer to them as being in Treatment L, for low probability) while
subjects who got a \9" have a 90% chance of being able to exchange their mug for the pen if they
would like (Treatment H).
After this rst round of instructions, and after an experimenter reads the most important parts
out loud, subjects answer some demographic questions and then ll out the rst part of a 44-item
\Big Five" personality questionnaire (John, Donahue, and Kentle, 1991). As usual, the goal of
such a \ller" questionnaire is to distract subjects from the main decision we are interested in, and
also to provide them with some time to plan their decision as to whether or not to exchange the
mug. After they nish answering the rst 22 questions, we remind them of the instructions and
procedures for the (possible) mug-pen exchange, in order to make sure they understand, and also
to make them think about their choice. Then, after they answer the second 22 questions of the
Big Five questionnaire, subjects are asked to make a choice conditional on the die coming up lower
than or equal to the number on their index card.11 This allows us to observe a decision for each
subject, not just the ones for which the decision actually turns out to apply, which is similar to the
strategy method often used in experimental games.12 Before rolling the die, we ask some additional
questions, as described in the next section.
The experiments were run at a lab at the Harvard Decision Sciences Lab. A total of 45 subjects
(23 females; mean age 21), all of them undergraduate students at Harvard, participated in our main
sessions. We conducted 10 sessions with between 3 and 7 subjects per session. Half the sessions
9More details are provided in a Methods Appendix available from the authors.
10Both items have a retail value of around $8. In a usual \endowment eect" experiment, half the subjects would
be endowed with a mug and the other half with a pen. We chose to endow all our subjects with the same item (which
we randomly picked by ipping a coin before our very rst session) in order to get sucient power for testing our
hypothesis of interest.
11They are asked to check one of the following: If the the die comes up [1 in treatment L; 1 to 9 in treatment H]:
 I want to keep the mug; or  I want to trade the mug for the pen.
12As is further discussed in the Theory Appendix, eliciting a subject's decision conditional on a choice set being
reached is theoretically equivalent to asking the subject to choose once the choice set is reached, if by then the subject
has made her plans (which determine her reference point).
6were run on one day in late October 2009, the other half over two days in early November. Subjects
received a show-up fee of $10, and the experiment took about 20 minutes.13
4 Results
4.1 Expectations Aect Exchange Behavior
Our main result shows that the proportion of subjects who indicate that they want to exchange
their mug for the pen is signicantly higher in the treatment where an exchange, if desired, is more
likely to occur:
RESULT 1: Subjects that have a 10% chance of being able to exchange are signicantly less likely
to be willing to exchange than subjects that have a 90% chance. The proportion of subjects who
choose to exchange in Treatments L and H are 22.7% and 56.5%, respectively (p=0.021, two-sided
two-sample test of proportions).
Thus, we conrm the prediction of KR (2006) that reference points matter for choice, and
that they are determined by expectations. The eect is large: subjects in Treatment H are 34
percentage points, or one and a half times, more likely to choose to exchange than subjects in
Treatment L. As a test of the robustness of the result, Table 1 reports the estimated marginal
eects from probit regressions that predict the probability a subject chooses to exchange from a
treatment indicator and other covariates that may be related to their choice. Among the covariates
we consider, gender signicantly predicts the desire to exchange: column (2) shows that females
seem to like the pen relatively more than males. However, the gender eect does not drive our
result, as our treatments were perfectly gender-balanced.14 Column (3) shows that when both
treatment and gender indicators are included as regressors, the indicator for Treatment H is still
signicant at p < 2%. Furthermore, column (4) shows that adding subject age and an indicator
for the month in which the session took place does not change the result either. If anything, the
estimated treatment eect becomes even larger.15
4.2 Expectations and Subject Evaluations
RESULT 2: According to questionnaire responses, subjects in treatment L like the mug more than
subjects in Treatment H, and more strongly agree with the statement that they spent more time
thinking about the mug than about the pen.
13In the November sessions, the subjects afterwards participated in a second, completely unrelated experiment.
The fact that these experiments were unrelated was made very clear to participants, and they were told that the rst
experiment involved the mugs and pens while the second involved choosing between various payment amounts. The
results below demonstrate that behavior was similar in the October and November sessions.
14We had 11 males and females each in Treatment L, and 11 males and 12 females in Treatment H.
15The robustness of the eect across subsets of sessions is surprisingly strong: the proportions of subjects in
treatments L and H who wanted to exchange were 23.1% and 53.9% in our October sessions (13 subjects per treatment)
and 22.2% and 60.0% in our November sessions (9 subjects in treatment L, 10 subjects in treatment H).
7Before rolling the die to determine whether a subject's decision applies, we asked the subjects
to indicate agreement or disagreement with the following statements (on a scale from 1 (disagree
strongly) to 5 (agree strongly)):
1. I like the mug better than the pen.
2. Since the beginning of the session, I have spent some time thinking about how I would use
the pen.
3. Since the beginning of the session, I have spent some time thinking about how I would use
the mug.
4. Since the beginning of the session, I have spent more time thinking about the mug than about
the pen.
Summary statistics on the responses by treatment are provided in Table 2. The table also
provides p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney tests of the null hypothesis of equal distributions
of responses across treatments. The table shows that subjects in Treatment L (mildly) signicantly
more strongly agree with the statement that they like the mug better than the pen, which is of
course consistent with the behavioral evidence. Subjects in both conditions are about equally likely
to agree to have spent some time thinking about using each item. However, subjects in Treatment
L more strongly agree to having spent more time (between the moment we explained the decision
situation and the moment they made their decision) thinking about the mug than about the pen.
This latter fact is consistent with a potential psychological mechanism through which the reference
point may be formed: the more likely you are to receive something, the more time you spend
thinking about it, which increases your \attachment" and would generate the feeling of a loss in
case you do not receive it.
In the debrieng questionnaire, we ask subjects which item they think has the higher retail
value, on a scale from \denitely pen" (1) to \denitely mug" (5). The nal row of Table 2 shows
that the answers do not dier signicantly across treatments, suggesting that our explicitly random
assignment to treatments prevented subjects from inferring anything about the relative values of
the two items.16
4.3 A Cautionary Tale: Results from a Pilot
Before settling on the design reported in the previous sections, we ran sessions in which we did not
make the random assignment to treatments obvious to subjects.
16Before rolling the die, we also asked subjects how much they would be willing to pay for the pen (hypothetically).
For subjects that chose to keep the mug, the question read \Suppose you had the chance to buy the pen. What is the
maximum you would be willing to pay for the pen?" For subjects that chose to exchange, the question was instead
\Suppose the dice roll comes up so that you must keep your mug, but you also had the chance to buy the pen. What
is the maximum you would be willing to pay for the pen?" Surprisingly, subjects who chose to keep the mug indicate
a mildly signicantly higher willingness-to-pay for the pen than subjects who would like to receive the pen instead
of the mug (means: $2.25 and $0.99; two-sided t-test p=0.086). However, there are no signicant dierences across
treatments.
8A total of 63 subjects participated (36 undergraduates, 23 summer school students, four grad-
uate students, all at Harvard; mean age 21.6) in 15 sessions conducted at the end of July 2009.
Of the subjects, 32 were randomly assigned (without their knowledge) to Treatment L' and 31 to
Treatment H'. Subjects in these treatments had the same probabilities of being able to exchange as
in L and H, respectively, and received very similar instructions, except that they were not told the
source of the probability they would be permitted to exchange (see Methods Appendix for more
details).
The results were the following: in Treatment H', 29.0% of subjects chose to exchange, while in
Treatment L', 62.5% chose to exchange, and the dierence in proportions is statistically signicant
at p < 0:01 (two-sided two-sample test of proportions). Thus, the results went in the opposite
direction of the ones in our main sessions reported above, and strongly contradicted our hypothesis
that subjects with a higher probability of being able to exchange should be more willing to do
so. After the rst few sessions, we realized that this may have been due to a \value inference"
eect: subjects who were given a low (10%) probability of being able to exchange their mug for
the pen may have inferred that the pen must therefore be more valuable. We then added the
question to the debrieng survey in which we ask subjects which item they believe has higher
retail value. Consistent with the value inference hypothesis, among the 19 subjects in Treatment
L' who answered the question, 13 (or 68.4%) indicated that they believed that the pen \denitely"
or \probably" had higher retail value, while the same was true for only four out of 14 (28.6%)
of subjects in Treatment H'. A two-sided Mann-Whitney test indicates that the distributions of
responses are signicantly dierent at p < 0:03.
Thus, we conclude that, in the pilot, our test of expectation-based reference points was con-
founded by an experimental design that created subject misconceptions about the relative values
of the two items. However, the pilot may also speak to the relative \strength" (or lack thereof)
of expectation-based reference points. While we nd evidence in favor of the theory in our clean
treatments, the eect of loss aversion can be more than outweighed by (perceived) value signals
provided by probabilities. Our results therefore also provide evidence on how subtle cues in the
experimental environment can have a strong inuence on subjects' behavior.
5 Discussion of Related Experiments
In this section, we discuss how our ndings relate to previous experimental evidence on the presence
or absence of the endowment eect, and show that interpreting previous studies in terms of the KR
theory can reconcile their varied ndings.
The classic early experiment demonstrating the endowment eect was conducted by Knetsch
(1989), who found that only about 10 percent of subjects that he endowed with either a mug or
a chocolate bar were subsequently willing to give up their assigned item in exchange for the other
item, while standard theory predicts that 50 percent should exchange. Such exchange asymmetries
have usually been interpreted as resulting from loss aversion around a reference point given by
9current endowments. However, a natural interpretation in terms of the KR theory is that, until the
opportunity to exchange is oered to participants, they fully expect to leave the experiment with
the item they were endowed with, so that expectations and endowments coincide.
Plott and Zeiler (2007) (henceforth PZ) argue that Knetsch's ndings (and those of other
researchers who replicated Knetsch's experiment) were largely driven by certain features of his
experimental procedures. PZ alter Knetsch's procedures in various ways and demonstrate that
such changes can have a large impact on the existence and magnitude of exchange asymmetries.
They interpret this result as evidence that the endowment eect observed in earlier studies is not
due to non-standard features of subjects' preferences.
However, when experimental procedures are altered, subjects' expectations of which item(s)
they will leave the experiment with may also change. In particular, PZ's procedures may have
made subjects believe that they would also be given a pen, or that there would be an opportunity
to exchange the mug for the pen. Their two treatments in which no exchange asymmetries are
observed, the \full set of controls" and the \loss emphasis treatment," begin as follows (p. 1459):
We began these sessions by informing the subjects that mugs and pens would be
used during the experiment. Subjects were then told that a coin was ipped before
the start of the experiment to determine which good, the mug or the pen, would be
distributed rst. We then distributed mugs to the subjects and announced, `These mugs
are yours.'17
In terms of the KR theory, the reference point of a subject who expects to receive both a mug
and a pen is umug in the mug dimension and upen in the pen dimension. When she then gets
surprised by the announcement that to obtain a pen, she has to give up her mug, she necessarily
feels a loss in one dimension, and therefore chooses the item with the higher consumption utility.
Similarly, a subject who expects to be able to exchange for sure will optimally plan to do so if the
consumption utility of the pen is higher than the one provided by the mug, and therefore will not
exhibit behavior predicted by theories that take the status quo as the reference point.
Thus, while PZ show that the endowment eect can disappear when certain experimental pro-
cedures are used, they do not directly manipulate or measure subjects' expectations that they
will leave with a mug or pen. While they argue that previously observed exchange asymmetries
are not due to reference-dependence but rather classical preferences interacting with experimental
procedures, their results are also consistent with the endowment eect being driven by reference-
dependent preferences, but with a reference point determined by expectations, not current endow-
ments.
17In their \loss emphasis treatment," PZ use somewhat stronger language to convey subjects' entitlement to the
endowed good; they say \The mug is yours. You own it." In footnote 13 (p. 1454), PZ give another account of the
specic language they use at the beginning of the experiment: \Specically, subjects were told, `Before the start of
the experiment, a coin was ipped to determine which good, the mug or the pen, to distribute. It came up heads,
which means that we start with the mugs (or pens). The subjects in the other room will start with the pens (or
mugs).'"
10Other work has found an \endowment eect" even when subjects do not formally own an item.
Knetsch and Wong (2009) nd exchange asymmetries in an experimental treatment in which they
give subjects an item, but tell them they do not yet own the item (but will own it at the end of the
session). They interpret this nding as evidence in favor of KR, and interpret the PZ procedures
as providing only a \weak reference state."18 However, an alternative explanation for their nding
is that it may be driven by subjects inferring something about the relative values of the items,
as in that particular treatment it is not revealed to the subjects that the item they received rst
was chosen randomly. As emphasized by PZ (and also conrmed by the ndings from our pilot
experiment reported in section 4.3), such seemingly innocuous procedural details can have a major
impact on exchange behavior. Nevertheless, the basic idea and the ndings of their experiment are
certainly consistent with KR.
6 Conclusion
In a simple decision context (keep or exchange an item), increasing subjects' expectations of leaving
with an item makes them less willing to exchange this item for an alternative. We have provided
evidence that individual's reference points are determined, at least in part, by expectations. Merely
manipulating the probability that subjects will have the opportunity to exchange, and explicitly
randomizing this probability so subjects know there is no information content in it, yields a strong
eect on exchange behavior.
Experimental and empirical ndings of individuals being reluctant to part with items they
currently own has traditionally been interpreted as evidence of individuals being loss averse around
the status quo. However, endowments often correspond to expectations, so that an interpretation of
these exchange asymmetries in terms of expectation-based reference points is equally compelling.
Furthermore, expectation-based reference points explain why some studies can endow subjects
with an item, yet not observe an endowment eect, while other studies observe an \endowment
eect" despite never having endowed subjects with an item. Future work should assess whether
endowments also directly aect reference points (or some other feature of preferences) independently
of expectations, though our interpretation of Plott and Zeiler (2007) suggests that they do not.
Our experiment provides clean evidence that expectations shape the reference point, and indicates
that the theory of K} oszegi and Rabin (2006) may be useful for economists who wish to model
reference-dependent preferences in economic applications.
18In this treatment, there is no upfront announcement to subjects that they will be able to alternatively get the
other item at the end. In another treatment, Knetsch and Wong closely follow PZ's procedures, except that they
explicitly tell subjects that at the end they will have the option to exchange, and conrm the absence of an endowment
eect under these conditions. They do not discuss that the announcement of having the possibility to exchange for
sure will lead KR to predict no endowment eect.
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13Table 1: Determinants of Desire to Exchange Mug for Pen
Pr(choose to exchange) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment H .338 .353 .399
(.137) (.139) (.147)






# observations 45 45 45 45
Notes: Displayed coecients are predicted marginal eects from
probit regressions (in case of dummy variables, for a discrete
change from 0 to 1). Dependent variable: Indicator variable =
1 if subject wants to exchange. Standard errors in parentheses.
Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
Table 2: Subject Evaluations of the Mugs and Pens
Treatment
Question L H p-value
1) \I like the mug better than the pen." 3.95 3.26 .061
(1.17) (1.25)
2) \Since the beginning of the session, I have spent 2.95 3.35 .366
some time thinking about how I would use the pen." (1.46) (1.23)
3) \Since the beginning of the session, I have spent 4.09 4.00 .960
some time thinking about how I would use the mug." (0.87) (1.09)
4) \Since the beginning of the session, I have spent 3.95 3.17 .056
more time thinking about the mug than about the pen." (1.13) (1.40)
5) \Which item do you think has higher retail value?" 3.50 3.26 .387
(1.14) (1.01)
Notes: Questions 1) to 4) were asked after subjects made their decision as to whether they
would like to trade, and are answered on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Question 5) was asked as part of the debrieng questionnaire, and is answered on the following
scale (with the corresponding number in brackets): \Denitely Pen" (1), \Probably Pen" (2),
\About the same" (3), \Probably Mug" (4), \Denitely Mug" (5). Standard deviations in
parentheses. p-values are from a two-sided nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
14A Appendix: Theory
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the model of K} oszegi and Rabin (2006) and conrm
its predictions in our experiment.
A.1 General Theory
The main objective of KR (2006) is to extend Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory
and to bring it closer to \standard" economic theory. In their formulation, the utility of a decision-
maker (henceforth DM) depends both on her consumption c and on how this consumption compares
to a reference level r. They assume separability between \consumption utility" m(c) and \gain-
loss utility" n(cjr). Consumption and reference levels can have multiple dimensions, so that c =
(c1;c2;:::;cK) and r = (r1;r2;:::;rK), and it is assumed that both forms of utility are additively
separable across dimensions, such that m(c) =
PK
k=1 mk(ck) and n(cjr) =
PK
k=1 nk(ckjrk): Total















where () is continuous and strictly increasing, and has the properties of the Kahneman-Tversky
value function: loss aversion (a kink at zero) and diminishing sensitivity. In what follows, we
will use the piecewise linear specication (as in section IV of KR, 2006) (x) = x for x > 0
and (x) = x for x  0, where  > 0 is the DM's weight on gain-loss utility and  > 1 her
loss-aversion coecient.19
In KR, the reference point is based on expectations of future outcomes, so that it is in fact a
reference lottery given by probability measure G : RK ! R over consumption utility in each of the




This formulation implies that when evaluating a dimension ck of a consumption outcome c, the
DM compares it separately to each possible value that this dimension could take according to the
reference lottery, and weights it by the probability of this outcome in the reference lottery.
But what exactly determines the reference lottery? KR employ the concept of personal equilib-
rium (PE), which requires the following:20
 the DM has a plan for every contingency that she can possibly face in a given decision
19This is not restrictive in our situation with binary outcomes.
20K} oszegi and Rabin (2007) refer to this equilibrium concept, which applies in situations in which decisions are
only made once the reference lottery is xed by expectations (as in our application), as \unacclimating personal
equilibrium." In contrast, if the DM could determine the reference lottery by her choice, the \choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium" concept would apply.
15situation;
 her reference lottery is based on her expectation to put these plans into action once she knows
which contingency applies; and
 her actions maximize expected RDU, given her reference lottery.
The timing of a decision situation in which PE applies is as follows:
 t =  1: DM starts focusing on the decision; knows all the possible choice sets she might face
at t = 1 and the probabilities with which they occur;
 t = 0: DM makes plans for each possible choice set, thereby setting her reference lottery;
 t = 1: `Nature' determines the choice set the DM actually faces. The DM follows through
on her plan for this choice set, which then yields either a deterministic or a probabilistic
outcome.
The PE concept requires the DM's actions at t = 1 to be optimal given her beliefs at t = 0,
beliefs formed at t = 0 to be rational given her plans, and her plans to be \credible" in the sense
that at t = 1 the DM has no incentive to deviate from them (akin to subgame perfection in standard
multi-player game theory).
KR emphasize that it is possible for multiple PEs to exist in a given situation. An example:
assume the consumption utilities resulting from actions x and y are not too dierent. Then, one
equilibrium may be for the DM to plan on x and indeed do x, but another one may be for her to
plan on y and do y (because if she planned on y and ended up doing x, she would feel a loss from
not getting the consequence of y, which may outweigh a possible consumption utility advantage of
x). In such a case KR's preferred way of equilibrium selection is to take the PE that gives the DM
the highest expected RDU, the preferred personal equilibrium (PPE).
A.2 Derivation of KR Portion of Proposition 1
Denote subject i's consumption utility from the mug by umug and the consumption utility from the
pen by upen.21 The treatment variable is p, the probability with which the subject will be able to
exchange the mug (which she is endowed with) against the pen. Each subject will have to indicate
whether she wants to exchange the mug for the pen (but her decision only applies with probability
p; with probability 1   p, she keeps the mug independently of her decision). We will refer to her
two possible actions as \exchange" and \keep."
The subjects know the choice sets that they may be facing, but are unable to commit to a
decision until the end of the session. In terms of the timeline from the previous subsection, the
moment when we announce to subjects that they own the mug and may have the possibility to
21Throughout, we assume upen;umug > 0; i.e. that subjects prefer both receiving the mug for sure and receiving
the pen for sure to receiving nothing.
16exchange the mug against a pen comprises t =  1. t = 0 is then the timespan during which the
subjects plan what they are going to do at t = 1, and this plan determines their reference lottery.
The moment when they make their decision is t = 1. Note that we elicit a decision from all subjects,
independently of whether their decision to exchange or not will in fact matter. In terms of the KR
theory, such a situation (occurring at t = 1) is no dierent from the alternative in which we rst
roll the die and then only elicit a decision if the appropriate number comes up. At this point, the
plan is made, and whether we elicit it as a plan or as an actual choice should not make a dierence.
We now examine how the conditions on umug and upen for a subject to choose \exchange" in a
PE or (more restrictively) the PPE vary with our treatment variable p.22
If a subject plans to choose \exchange" if given the choice, then she expects rend w=pen to occur
with probability p and and rend w=mug to occur with probability 1   p. Her utility of outcome c;
given her expectations, is then









If she follows through with her plan, her gain-loss utility in the dierent outcome cases is as follows:
 if her decision applies (which happens with probability p): p  0 + (1   p)(upen   umug)
 if it does not apply (which happens with probability 1   p): p(umug   upen) + (1   p)  0
Therefore, her expected utility from sticking to her plan to say \exchange" is given by23
EU(\exchange"j\exchange") = p[U (f1 pen, 0 mugsgj\exchange")]
+(1   p)[U (f0 pens, 1 muggj\exchange")]
= p[upen + (1   p)(upen   umug)]
+(1   p)[umug + p(umug   upen)]
Meanwhile, if having planned to exchange, she deviates and chooses to say \keep" instead, her
gain-loss utility would equal p(umug   upen) for sure, and her total expected utility would be
equal to
EU(\keep"j\exchange") = umug + p(umug   upen):
Choosing to exchange is then a PE if and only if EU(\exchange"j\exchange")  EU(\keep"j\exchange"),
which boils down to the condition
upen  umug
1 + ( + p(1   ))




22We limit our focus to pure-strategy equilibria.
23The notation U(\x"j\y") means \utility from action x if the reference lottery is (the result of plan) y:"
17As  > 1 and  > 0 we have that












In words, this means that if the probability p of getting the possibility to exchange the pen for
the mug is low, the consumption utility a subject gets from the pen has to \much higher" for
\exchange" to be a personal equilibrium. On the other hand, if p is high (p > 1
2), \exchange" may
be a PE even if upen < umug. However, in such a case, \keep" may be a PE as well for certain
(umug;upen) combinations, and it may indeed be the PPE. We have EU(\keep"j\keep") = umug
(there is no gain-loss utility when the subject is certain to keep the mug). Thus, \exchange" would
be the PPE if and only if EU(\exchange"j\exchange")  EU(\keep"j\keep"); or
p(upen   umug) + [p(1   p)(upen   umug) + (1   p)p(umug   upen)]  0;
which simplies to
(upen   umug) +  (1   p)(1   )(upen + umug)  0:
For p < 1, \exchange" can be the PPE only if the pen gives higher consumption utility (upen >
umug), as the second term is negative due to loss aversion ( > 1): Crucial for our hypothesis,
note that as p is increased, \exchange" is the PPE for more pairs of upen and umug (the required
consumption utility surplus from the pen becomes smaller), as increasing p makes the second
term less negative. Finally, note that the more loss averse individuals are, the less likely it is
that \exchange" is the PPE, as increasing  amplies the gain-loss utility from sometimes being
disappointed about being unable to exchange.
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